Iranian aid to Hezbollah

Overview

The bulk of Hezbollah’s operational apparatus was established from 1982 onwards, through extensive Iranian assistance. This assistance comprises financial support, large supplies of arms (mostly via Damascus) and the training of Hezbollah militia. In addition, Hezbollah depends on Syrian political and military support, which was significantly expanded after Bashar al-Assad acceded to the presidency.

Iran views Hezbollah as its spearhead in the use of the weapon of terror, in general, and its use against Israeli targets, in particular. It also regards Hezbollah as a main source of inspiration and a model for leadership in the context of the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, and in the broader context, as a key instrument in the Islamic war against Israel. This view is evidenced by the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei’s statement in which he explicitly called on Hezbollah to focus its activities on supporting the Palestinian struggle. Khamenei made this statement after his meetings with senior members of Hezbollah at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Intifada held in Tehran in April 2001. Iran also made sure that the appeal would be reiterated in the final communiqué of the conference, which called on “all those who took part in the liberation of southern Lebanon to assist the Palestinian resistance".

The al-Quds [“Jerusalem”] Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard deployed in Lebanon is the Iranian extension operating in Lebanon and assisting Hezbollah. Al-Quds Force provides military guidance for and support of terror attacks against Israel, especially those carried out by Hezbollah and Palestinian secular as well as Islamic terror organizations. This support comprises sizeable financial resources and far-reaching military assistance down to the tactical level.

Iran’s military support to Hezbollah includes the following:

Providing training and instruction to Hezbollah militia on various military and operational topics

Iran sends military supplies to Lebanon by air via the al-Quds Force. These supplies pass through the Damascus International Airport, and constitute Hezbollah’s near-exclusive arsenal for terror attacks against Israel. The Iranians are aware of this fact, and maintain the continuity of the military assistance, with Syrian blessing, thus gradually building up the organization’s military and operational capability. In the course of the past few years, Hezbollah has been supplied, mainly via air shipments, with large quantities of high-quality arms, including upgraded anti-tank missiles, Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft cannons and missiles of various calibers, SA-7 and SA-14 shoulder missiles, equipment and arms for small-scale maritime warfare, motorized gliders, and even sophisticated military hardware such as long-range land-to-land missiles of types Fajr-3 (with a 43 km range) and Fajr-5 (with a 75 km range). No other terror organization worldwide is known to enjoy such a massive and well-coordinated ongoing supply of high-quality arms.

A Fajr-5 missile launcher, posing a strategic threat to population centers in Israel as far south as the Hadera region -
an instrument of military power in the hands of Iran and Hezbollah in the Israeli-Arab conflict,
and a potential means of escalation in the future

The al-Quds Force plays an important role in Hezbollah’s operational contingency planning for military escalation against Israel, in outlining its implementation and in determining relevant levels of response by Hezbollah. The significance of the al-Quds Force role is that the Iranians are instrumental in planning Hezbollah’s operational-terror pursuits, and are capable of triggering regional deterioration whenever they see fit.

Financing the buildup of military-terror power: the financial assistance from Iran allows Hezbollah to translate its plans into actual military escalation and operational deployment. After Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Iran stepped up its financial support to Hezbollah as part of the Iranian policy of promoting Hezbollah’s military deployment against Israel, and in order to enhance its ability to support Palestinian violence and boost its impact as the ruling power in southern Lebanon.

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The 1994 bombing of the AMIA building: A case study in Iran’s
use of Hezbollah as a terror contractor

The bombing of the US embassy in Beirut in 1983

After	Before

Imad Mughniyah Cnn.com

The bombing of the AMIA building

After thegully.com	Before

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Overview

On July 18, 1994, the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires sustained a bomb attack that killed 86 people and injured some 250. The AMIA center was completely destroyed and serious damage was caused to the adjoining buildings.

The attack was carried out by means of a car bomb filled with hundreds of kilograms of explosives and driven by a suicide terrorist. A similar scenario characterized the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, in which 29 people were killed and more than 220 were injured.

The Argentinian intelligence service (SIDE) recently completed an extensive report on the AMIA bombing. Its main findings: The Iranian government initiated the bomb attack. Ali Fallahian, Iran’s then-Intelligence Minister, was given the responsibility for carrying out the bombing. The Iranian intelligence service assigned the operation to the Hezbollah organization. The bombing was carried out by Hezbollah’s terror apparatus headed by Imad Mughniyah, Hezbollah’s second-in-command and leader of its military wing. Syria was, at the least, aware of the goings-on.

According to the report, Hezbollah elements availed themselves of a widespread network of collaborators within Argentina to perform the attack. The largest concentrations of these collaborators were located in the Tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, as well as in the Floresta district of Buenos Aires. These local networks of collaborators were established and trained by the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, which assigned them to assist Hezbollah in carrying out the bombing.

The devastation left by the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina

The findings of the SIDE report fully concur with the intelligence profile in Israel concerning the AMIA bombing. The following is an analysis of the bombing, its perpetrators, and the course of action taken, based on information in the possession of the Israeli intelligence community.

The wreckage after the AMIA bombing: serious damage to the Jewish Community Center and adjacent building

The decision-making level: Iran’s top echelon

The decision in principle to carry out a second terror attack in Argentina was made in August 1993, approximately one year before the attack, during a meeting of Iran’s “Supreme Council for National Security”. In attendance were Iran’s leader Khamenei; then-Iranian President, Rafsanjani; then-Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati; the Iranian leader’s aide on intelligence and security, Mohammad Hijazi; and then-Intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian.

A number of concurrent factors seem to have influenced the decision, including the success of the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires two years earlier, the deterioration of relations between Argentina and Iran at the time, and the operational resources in Argentina at Iran’s and Hezbollah’s disposal. The decision was conveyed to Fallahian by way of a fatwa, or religious ruling, issued by the spiritual leader, Khamenei.

It was only natural to assign the Intelligence Minister at the time, Ali Fallahian to the execution of the terror mission and the preparation of the “target intelligence” concerning the AMIA building. Fallahian appointed Hezbollah’s overseas terror apparatus headed by Imad Mughniyah to carry out the bombing as Iran’s “contractor”, in the same manner as it had carried out the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires.

The actual timing for the bombing was scheduled on the basis of an assessment of the situation and in accordance with ongoing developments. The main trigger for carrying out the AMIA bombing may well have been Iran’s intention to retaliate against Argentina for the cooling off of relations between the two countries and Argentina’s renouncement of cooperation agreements signed with Iran. Furthermore, it has not been ruled out that, in Iran’s view, Israel and Jewish elements in Argentina played a role in what Iran felt as the souring of bilateral relations at that time. Additional triggers were Mustafa Dirani’s abduction from Lebanon to Israel on May 21, 1994 and the Israeli air strike on Hezbollah’s training camp at Ayn Dardara in eastern Lebanon on June 2, 1994, both of which were perceived as assaults on Iranian interests.

The terror contractor: the Hezbollah organization

Iran, consistent with its traditional policy of diverting incriminating evidence and camouflaging its involvement in terror activity, chose to implement the bombing by means of a Lebanese “contractor”, equipped with a world-embracing apparatus and proven operational capabilities: the Hezbollah organization.

Hezbollah enjoyed (and still does) significant advantages when operating in the Argentinian arena: It relies on a diverse network of collaborators spread throughout the Lebanese community in Argentina. From this community, Hezbollah chose its recruits mainly in the Tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and the Floresta district in Buenos Aires. A select and classified group from within this community was assigned to actually assist in the logistic aspects of the bomb attack.

During recent years, a number of similar networks belonging to Hezbollah’s overseas terror apparatus have been uncovered in various places around the world, including Southeast Asia and the Middle East. This indeed appears to be Hezbollah’s preferred modus operandi up until today. Also noteworthy are the many similarities to al-Qaida’s practice of operating local networks, the activities of which have been exposed far and wide since the September 11th attacks.

Hezbollah’s network of collaborators in Argentina is the direct, assiduous product of the Iranian embassy in Argentina, established as early as the 1980s, and carefully nurtured ever since. This activity was originally intended to broaden the circle of supporters of the Islamic Revolution throughout world Islamic communities, and in particular among the Shiites worldwide. However, in practice, and as evidenced in many countries around the world, these networks have also been used for establishing terror cells. These cells are kept latent for assistance to be extended, whenever needed, to terror attacks such as the bombings in Argentina.

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Hezbollah’s apparatus in the Tri-border region and other Latin American regions

On June 24, 2002, a Lebanese citizen by the name of As’ad Barakat was arrested in Brazil on suspicion of raising funds and transferring them to terror groups in the Middle East. He was charged among other things with fund-raising on behalf of Hezbollah and establishing front companies to finance al-Qaida activity in Latin America. His arrest resulted from an extensive investigation initiated in the wake of the September 11th attacks against the US. According to the working assumption of a large number of intelligence services, the Tri-border region houses the main financial apparatus for the funding of terror activity related to Iranian-supported terror organizations. Indeed, Hezbollah’s activity during recent years has mainly centered on the Tri-border region, and in particular the Paraguayan town of Ciudad del Este and the Brazilian town of Foz do Iguaçu.

The Tri-border region is home to a sizeable Lebanese community, part of which lives there illegally. The latter is encouraged by the absence of authority exercised by the local administrations, and the loosely controlled borders which allow for easy passage between the countries. The local Lebanese community is an established and prosperous one, active in both legitimate trade and illegal dealings (such as weapons and drug smuggling and forgery). Some of its members support the Lebanese Shiite and Syrian-backed Amal organization, while others adhere to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Hezbollah operatives in the region usually meet and coordinate their activities in mosques, religious centers, and homes. In recent years, a tendency toward Islamic extremism has become evident among the Latin American Shiite community, facilitating Hezbollah’s infiltration into the region.

Hezbollah seeks to extend its activity to the northern part of Latin America as well. To this end, the organization has embarked on establishing new apparatuses in various locations along the borders. Examples of such locations are the town of Darien, Panama near the border shared with Colombia, and Lago Agrio, a town in the north of Ecuador near the Colombian border. Hezbollah has also increased its activity in Cuba, as part of an effort to transform this country into a focal point of activity in the Mexico-Chile-Bolivia zone.

During 2002, a number of senior members of Hezbollah from Lebanon visited Latin America in order to strengthen relations with the local Lebanese communities, raise funds, and recruit operatives on behalf of Hezbollah. During their stay, they forged close links with the Iranian embassies in Brasilia and Buenos Aires.

The Iranian authorities’ assistance to the AMIA bombing

All relevant authorities in the Iranian administration assisted in carrying out the AMIA bombing. The Iranian Foreign Ministry provided the diplomatic cover and the local official delegations, and in fact functioned as the extension of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry. More specifically, close to the scheduled time of the AMIA bombing, a sharp increase was noted in the arrivals of Iranian diplomatic couriers into Argentina. This fact gives rise to the suspicion that Iranian couriers transferred equipment linked to the bombing, or that their identity as diplomatic couriers was merely a cover for their actual dealings as agents of Iran’s Intelligence Ministry, some of them indeed having resided in Argentina for much longer than is customary for diplomatic couriers. Alternatively, the courier activity may have served to obscure specific operational activity for the preparation of the bombing, simultaneously handled behind the scenes by Hezbollah.

Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance promotes relations with Muslim communities abroad. This ministry’s activity officially focuses on matters of information, education, and culture. In practice, however, it has served both to camouflage activities carried out by Iran’s Intelligence Ministry and to independently promote the establishment of a terror network. The latter was particularly conspicuous in the Argentinian context: the main force behind building up the local terror apparatus was none other than Mohsen Rabbani, the Iranian cultural attaché at the embassy in Buenos Aires.

Ahmad Reza Asghari: formerly Third Secretary at the Iranian Embassy to Argentina. His actual identity is Mohsen Ranjbaran, head of the Iranian Intelligence branch in Argentina, who was directly involved in the AMIA bombing.
Asghari appears on the list of Iranian diplomats charged by Argentina with involvement in the AMIA bombing [Reuters August 9, 1994; AFP August 10, 1994 )		Mohsen Rabbani: the Iranian cultural attaché in Argentina and the main figure behind building up the local terror apparatus

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have been actively involved, especially since the early 1990s, in promoting overseas terror and bombing apparatuses. This activity is conducted in cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, and consistent with the Iranian regime’s interests. In the context of the AMIA bombing, the Revolutionary Guards’ main impact consisted of extensive support granted to Hezbollah in the areas of training, instruction, financial aid, and logistic assistance.

As mentioned above, the execution of the bombing was assigned to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, to be carried out by Hezbollah. Based on our knowledge of its mode of operation, this implies that the Iranian Intelligence Ministry was involved in consolidating the intelligence picture, carrying out the operational monitoring required for the outline plan of the bomb attack; assisting in the purchase of the explosives, and possibly also in smuggling them into Argentina and delivering them to the perpetrators. The Intelligence Ministry availed itself of delegates of various other Iranian authorities posted in Argentina to assist in carrying out its plan, including the bombing itself.

The investigation headed by the German legal authorities of the murder of four leaders of the Kurdish opposition to the Tehran regime, known as the 1992 Mykonos affair, was concluded in 1997. The German court established definitively that the manner in which this terror attack was initiated and carried out was strongly reminiscent of the attack on the AMIA building. Similar to the AMIA bombing, in the case of the Mykonos bombing, the decision was made at the highest echelon of the Iranian administration, and the Ministry of Intelligence was placed in charge of carrying out the attack.

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The preparatory phases of the bombing

Upon the decision to carry out the AMIA bombing, in August 1993, all involved parties in Iran and Hezbollah set out to advance the goal: The gathering of target intelligence was accelerated; various operational aspects were examined; a political working plan was drawn up for the exploitation of the bombing and the repair of possible damages; and the logistical groundwork for the bombing was put into place.

To illustrate the above process: At the end of 1993, Mohsen Rabbani, then still in office in Argentina, had already conducted several checks regarding the purchase of a Renault Traffic van – the same car brand eventually used for the car bomb. Around the same time, Rabbani had on several occasions left Argentina and stayed in Iran. In March 1994, he returned to Argentina, where he stayed until the bombing.

It appears that by the summer of 1994, operational preparations had already reached an advanced stage. Following a new evaluation of the situation conducted by Iran and Hezbollah, the decision was presumably made to carry out the bombing. After an additional month-and-a-half of final preparations, the bombing was indeed perpetrated. During May and June 1994, Hezbollah leaders issued a number of communiqués about the organization’s “long arm” whose reach extends throughout the world. These may be seen in retrospect as laying the propaganda groundwork in anticipation of the bombing.

In June 1994 and during the days preceding the bombing, in mid-July, several “incriminating signs” were evident (ex post facto), consisting of changes in the routine behavior of those involved in the preparations. For example, ten days before the bombing, the head of the Iranian intelligence agency in Buenos Aires left Argentina hurriedly and unexpectedly. Furthermore, Iran’s ambassador to Argentina as well as its ambassadors to Chile and Uruguay could not be found at their respective offices at the time of the bombing.

The execution of the bombing

Several days before the bombing, a suicide terrorist by the name of Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a member of Hezbollah in Lebanon, arrived in Argentina. He entered the country from the Tri-border region, escorted by one of Hezbollah’s collaborators from that region. It appears that around the same time, the preparation of the car bomb was completed, somewhere in Buenos Aires. The car was reportedly parked in a public parking lot, not far from the AMIA building, about three days before the bombing. During the days that preceded the bombing, Iranian officials and Hezbollah collaborators in Argentina reportedly made an unusually large number of phone calls to Lebanon and Iran.

On July 18, 1994, a few hours before the bombing, the suicide terrorist called his family in Lebanon, and told them that he was “about to join his brother”. The brother, As’ad Hussein Berro, was a suicide bomber who had been killed in a car bombing of Israeli troops in the Security Zone in Lebanon on August 9, 1989. On July 18, 1994, at 09:53 hours a.m., Berro drove the Renault Traffic van, loaded with hundreds of kilograms of explosives, into the entrance to the AMIA building and blew the car up.

Who is As’ad Hussein Berro – the brother of Ibrahim Hussein Berro, who committed a suicide bombing at the entrance to the AMIA building On August 9, 1989, Hezbollah committed a suicide attack by blowing up a car bomb in the Security Zone, on the road leading to the Christian town of Marj Ayoun in Lebanon. As a result, five Israeli soldiers and one soldier of the Southern Lebanon Army were wounded. Hezbollah, under the name of “Islamic Resistance”, assumed responsibility for the attack. The action was presented as the first act of retaliation following the abduction of Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubeid by Israel (Voice of Islam, August 9, 1989). A video cassette screened two days after the attack, featured As’ad Berro. He said that he wanted to kill Salman Rushdie, calling for the exposure of the latter’s whereabouts in order to kill him. He mentioned that the attack carried out against the “Israeli cancer” is a gift granted by Hezbollah in honor of the uprising in the Palestinian territories. As’ad Berro expressed his hope that his action would constitute a modest step toward the annihilation of the Zionist entity (Reuters, August 11, 1989).

Covering up the evidence

On September 9, 1994, Hezbollah announced (through the Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled Radio Nur) the death of one of its operatives, “killed in action” in the Talousa region of southern Lebanon. The name given was Ibrahim Hussein Berro. Lebanese media reported that Berro, born in 1973, is the brother of the martyr As’ad Hussein Berro, who had been killed in action near Marj Ayoun in 1989. The announcement of Ibrahim Hussein Berro’s death was therefore made two months late, with seemingly no connection to the AMIA bombing.

Hezbollah strives to portray itself as an organization active only on the Lebanese scene, avoiding any identification with terror activity, especially such as takes place in the international arena. Hence its reluctance to assume any responsibility in the Buenos Aires bombing, and its distortion of the facts and dates relating to the perpetrator’s involvement in the AMIA bombing.

Removing the wreckage of the AMIA building

The remnants of the car bomb after the terror attack against the AMIA building

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