Saudi television presents testimonies by detainees held at Al-Ha'ir prison, in which they speak in favor of the treatment they are given by the security [apparatuses] [after surrendering themselves following the authorities' initiative]

One of them says: “If I had known it was [that] simple, I would have turned myself in [a long time ago]”.

Riyadh : Munif al-Safouqi

Yesterday night, Saudi television aired a documentary on Al-Ha'ir prison, presenting testimonies by detainees involved in terrorist activities that have been plaguing Saudi Arabia since May 12, 2003 . The beginning of the film features a short overview on Al-Ha'ir prison and the concept behind its establishment. Next, the stories of some of the detainees are presented. One of them, named Fikri al-Faqih, said that because he had heard of prisoners being tortured, beaten and hanged, [he] refused to surrender himself. [Fikri noted], however, that [he later discovered that] the reality was [completely] different, and added: “If I [had known] it was [that] simple, I would have turned myself in [a long time ago]”.

Abd al-Rahman al-Ahmari, one of the detainees who appeared in the documentary, explained that [they, i.e., detainees like him] heard about torture, humiliation and other things which, as he pointed out, “could have or could have not [been] true”. [However], later on he added that after he had been imprisoned, he discovered that Al-Ha'ir prison was different from what he had heard, since he discovered that the prison management was highly sympathetic to the prisoners. What is more, one of the wanted [activists is] Uthman Aal Maqboul al-Amri, featured on the list of twenty-six men published by the security authorities on December 6, 2003 . Uthman, who surrendered himself in the wake of the [Saudi] royal pardon, pointed out that the prison personnel who took care of him during his time in prison were “better than his own family”. [He] even stressed that his words were not mere flattery, and that “if they [i.e., detainees like him] knew the truth, many of the wanted [activists] would be quick to turn themselves in”. One of the prisoners, Sheikh Abdallah al-Silmi, voiced his support for Al-Amri's view, saying: “Had I known that would be the situation, I would have turned myself in a long time ago, as did my friend who turned himself in and suggested that I turn myself in as well”.

For his part, Abdallah bin Bajad, who monitors the [radical] Islamic groups' affairs, had the following to say in an interview granted to Al-Sharq al-Awsat: “There are several reasons for the negative portrayal of the Saudi security [apparatus], including portraying them as being violent. One of the key [characteristics] portrayed is the attempt to recruit [by force] [radical Islamic] operatives for the [Saudi security] apparatus instead of them having to turn themselves in”. Bajad pointed out that [the terrorists] succeeded [in creating this negative image] in view of the fact that the [official] pardon initiative did not gain much popularity. He also clarified that if the security apparatuses had made an effort and made their [positive] intentions clear at an earlier phase, it would have had much more impact on the [rate] of wanted [Saudi Islamic radical activists] turning themselves in, particularly in light of the above-mentioned pardon initiative [having been made public].

Obeid al-Qahtani's testimony laid the blame at the door of the terrorists, who take advantage of people's trust and naivety for [the realization of] their schemes. He clarified that since he had to get rid of heavy debts, [he] had to consider selling his car. A resident of his village, wanted [activist] Fares Aal Shawil al-Zahrani, “volunteered” to sell it on Al-Qahtani's behalf, giving him the false impression that he had experience in car sales procedures. He added that Al-Zahrani rejected him over and over again in order to keep the car for himself [for] a long period of time, disregarding his urgent need of money. He did that in order to use the car for his own benefit and for prohibited activities without [Al-Qahtani's] knowledge. This [situation] later brought to his arrest on grounds that his car was found in the possession of another person wanted for security-related matters.

Within the same context, one of the detainees, Hafiz al-Mari, said that the terrorists were eager to influence the people, particularly those turning to religion [i.e., those “born again” Muslims]. [This is done] by distributing articles [preaching] for achieving certain goals by certain means; for instance, the [first and foremost] duty of every Muslim is to help his brothers in faith. Under these pressures, [the above Muslim] acts in the direction those [Muslim] radicals want him to.

Abdallah bin Bajad believes that these immoral methods, employed deliberately by those who join [the ranks of] terrorist organizations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, are a disgrace, “for they use deceptive tactics to take advantage of those strata in society that support them or the naivety of those who turn to religion”. He added that the incident described by one of the participants [in the documentary] proved that Fares Aal Shawil al-Zahrani used the car owner's need for his own advantage, lied to him deliberately and acted deceptively and in a manner prohibited according to the law. All the while, [he knew] that the owner of the car would not agree to put it to a use [that might have] caused harm.

[Abdallah bin Bajad] added that the terrorists were deliberately employing similar tactics, such as faking the documents of the donations that serve for fast-breaking feasts among fasting [Muslims], assistance for Muslims in need or construction of mosques. [In practice, however,] those funds are used for supporting terrorism. Bin Bajad stated that the donors were [completely] unaware of the true nature of those groups or [the nature of] their paperwork which, on the face of it, looks perfectly legal. In fact, those [groups] have a basic message one cannot go wrong about, while their practical application is [fundamentally] different.

[Abdallah bin Bajad] pointed out that there were moral and religious disagreements among [the members of those groups], disagreements they attempt to cover up, caused by the intensifying conflict between them and the security [apparatuses] and [between them and] the [local] society. According to bin Bajad, there is [historical] evidence to that effect [that is, Islamic historical precedents]. For in the beginning of their activity, the Khawarij ⁴ operated on a strictly ideological and theoretical [basis]. Next, they were murdering Muslims, and finally found themselves engaging in mutual slaughter. A similar situation also exists among present-day [radical Islamic] groups in Egypt and Algeria , that gave rise to numerous [pretentious] slogans, such as “rule according to Islamic law [ Shari ‘ah ] and according to Allah's decree” and “[restoring social] justice to the people”. Later, [however], [these groups turned to perpetrate] inhuman acts such as murdering women and children and pillaging.

For his part, Sheikh Abdallah al-Silmi stated that he had considered turning himself in to the security apparatuses, after watching Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Naif bin Abd al-Aziz, speak about terrorism on television, saying: “Those who have embraced the idea of terrorism should turn themselves in—those who have not taken part in the illegal activities will not be prosecuted.” He pointed out that this measure was embraced by some of the supporters of the idea of terrorism who even turned themselves in and were eventually released. In addition, [he] watched a television interview with Ali al-Khudhair ⁵, one of the [Saudi] sheikhs inciting [for terrorism], during which he renounced the idea of terrorism. He [also] heard [other Saudi] clerics speak on other subjects related to terrorism. It was such a shock to him, he said, that he understood he had made a mistake.

[Bajad addressed] the attempts made by some of the wanted [activists], particularly those who were not directly involved in terrorist activity, to deceive the country. [They did so by] turning themselves in and declaring that they denounced the ideas of terrorism, while deep down inside, their views remained the same [i.e. they still supported terrorism]. Bajad explained that the reason for that was obvious [in face of] “their weakness against an overwhelming security force; that is why they continue to wear this deeply-ingrained cover [i.e., pretending that they are good Muslims who denounce terrorism], that [supposedly] provides them with insurance [against continuing to be] security risks”. He drew attention to the fact that this “escape route” was considered to be “acceptable” among those who support terrorism. In addition, the heretic [i.e., the radical Islamic] groups have many books allowing [them] to spread lies on the security authorities in order to avoid being convicted.

Appendix

The late Ayatollah Khomeini (the leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the Republic created thereafter, died in 1989) provided a binding religious Islamic edict legitimizing using zakat funds to finance the armed Palestinian insurgency against Israel . A book published (in Arabic) by the Syrian Ministry of Information (2000) deals with Khomeini's view of the Palestinian problem based on his speeches and on his religious Islamic edicts ( fatwas ). The book, called Palestine in the Speeches of the Ayatollah Khomeini , quotes him as saying that the State of Israel constitutes a continuing threat to Islam and the Islamic countries . Therefore, according to Khomeini, it is the duty of all Muslims in general and the Muslim régimes in particular “ to get rid of that germ of corruption [i.e., Israel ] in any way possible .” To that end “ it is not enough to extend practical support to them [the Palestinians] [to achieve] the goal but [it is also possible] to direct resources to that end from the zakat and other Islamic charity monies. ” ¹¹

A financial jihad [holy war] (al-jihad bil-mal) ¹⁶

The concept of jihad means, in this context, a battle in the way [ i.e ., for the sake] of Allah waged by the Muslim faithful against the infidels. Muslims who die as a result of the jihad (the list currently topped by Palestinian suicide bombers) reflect the highest level of piety and devotion according to the beliefs of Islam and therefore receive the appropriate rewards in paradise. However, literally speaking, the term jihad has implications broader than simple military battles, according to the decisions of qualified Muslim clerics from the dawn of Islam to the present day.

Accordingly, the meaning of the term jihad has been expanded to include the following :

Jihad by means of the Qur'an , (al jihad bil-Qur'an) that is through debate and preaching ( da'wah ) the Islamic religion.

Jihad of the soul ( al- jihad bil-nafs ) , that is, every Muslim's internal moral struggle to abandon evil and to adhere to the goodness commanded by Allah. The jihad of the soul includes the good Muslim deeds required of the faithful, such as study, preaching and the willingness to sacrifice one's life for the sake of Allah.

Examples of the importance of a fiancial jihad can be found in a lecture given by the well-known radical Muslim cleric sheikh Yussuf al-Qardawi in the UAE, in which he said that the money collected for the mujahideen [jihad warriors] was not a contribution or present for them but a duty in view of the sacrifices they were making for the Muslim nation. ²⁰ Hussein Shihatah, a cleric who belongs to the faculty of Al-Azhar University in Cairo , issued a fatwa stating that Muslims were committed to an “economic jihad, ” which meant designating funds to be used for jihad and the mujahideen . ²¹ Other examples appeared in a document issued by the Chechen mujahideen entitled “Seventy ways to support the Chechen jihad ,” and in another posted on Al-Qaeda's Internet site called “Thirty-nine ways to fund the jihad .” Both stressed the importance of donating money and equipment to the mujahideen .

The emphasis put on a financial jihad expresses current Islamic terrorism's recognition of the fact that a jihad can only attain its goals if it constructs a broad apparatus and support system which assure it the constant funding it needs for its military activity and an intricate social system to provide the Palestinian fighters and their families with financial security (of which they must be well aware). Thus it can create a solid social foundation which will inculcate its ideology into the consciousness of the fighters. Hamas partakes of the same ideology, and led by the late sheikh Ahmad Yassin, it was one of the first Palestinian Islamic terrorist organizations to establish a broad-based social-economic system which supported terrorism .